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Abstract—After decades of research, Internet of Things (IoT)
is finally permeating real-life and helps improve the efficiency of
infrastructures and processes as well as our health. As massive
number of IoT devices are deployed, they naturally incurs great
operational costs to ensure intended operations. To effectively
handle such intended operations in massive IoT networks, au-
tomatic detection of malfunctioning, namely anomaly detection,
becomes a critical but challenging task. In this paper, motivated
by a real-world experimental IoT deployment, we introduce
four types of wireless network anomalies that are identified
at the link layer. We study the performance of threshold- and
machine learning (ML)-based classifiers to automatically detect
these anomalies. We examine the relative performance of three
supervised and three unsupervised ML techniques on both non-
encoded and encoded (autoencoder) feature representations. Our
results demonstrate that; i) automatically generated features
using autoencoders significantly outperform the non-encoded
representations and can improve F1 score up to 500% and ii)
among the best performing models based on F1 score, supervised
ML models outperform the unsupervised counterpart models
with about 18% on average for anomaly types SuddenD and
SuddenR, and this trend also applies to SlowD and InstaD
anomalies, albeit with a tiny margin.
Index Terms—Anomaly Detection, Internet of Things (IoT),
Machine Learning (ML), Wireless Links, Wireless Networks
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) has received a plethora of
attention from both industry and academia due to the market
release of a variety of smart devices on a regular basis,
e.g. the devices retrofitted in home appliances, wearables,
healthcare, vehicles and industrial machinery, just to name
a few [1]. To this end, extensive research efforts have been
put forward for their active deployment and development to
enable increasingly efficient and more automated operations in
manufacturing, agriculture, transportation and healthcare, but
also due to their massive economic contributions [2].
Valid business cases [3] and successful real-world large-
scale IoT deployments are emerging as a way to improve exist-
ing business processes as well as enable new applications [2].
However, once the network of sensors is deployed, it becomes
part of the operational infrastructure of a business, and needs to
be maintained and serviced similar to any other infrastructure,
such as legacy IT infrastructure, robots and machines just to
name a few. Minimizing maintenance costs while ensuring the
reliability of IoT network [4] becomes prohibitive when the
number of sensors are in their thousands or tens of thousands.
To efficiently manage such massive IoT networks, automatic
IoT network monitoring [5] and malfunction detection [6]
solutions that automatically report relevant malfunctions and
filter them out without influencing the business process are
required.
IoT network or node malfunctioning can also be referred to
as network or node anomaly and to date, it has been defined
in various ways, often from the perspective of monitored
networking aspects. For instance, Sheth et al. [6] define
and identify anomalies from the IEEE 802.11 physical layer
perspective, namely, hidden terminal, capture effect, noise and
signal strength variation anomalies, whereas Gupta et al. [7]
define anomalies from multihop networking perspective with
the aspects, such as black hole, sink hole, selective forwarding
and flooding. Alipour et al. [8] define the anomalies from
IEEE 802.11 link layer security perspective with the focus
on aspects, such as injection test, deauthentication attack,
disassociation attack, association flood and authentication
flood. Generally speaking, anomaly detection research in IoT
networks can be found in the form of intrusion, fraud and
fault detection, system health monitoring, event detection in
sensor networks and detecting ecosystem disturbances [9],
where most studies mainly concerned with a certain type of
anomaly within a specific scenario.
In this paper, motivated by a real-world experimental IoT
deployment, we introduce four types of IoT anomalies that
can be identified at the link layer, namely sudden degradation,
sudden degradation with recovery, instantaneous degradation
and slow degradation. Rather than focusing on the cause of an
anomaly as realized in [6] and [7], we focus our attention on
the observable symptoms of link measurements, namely the
changes in the expected received signal. Based on the type of
anomaly, we identify possible root causes that may be related
to hardware, firmware and the channel, and develop models for
automatically classifying the introduced anomalies. The main
contributions of this paper are as follows.
1) Based on the gained knowledge while operating the
LOG-a-TEC wireless experimentation testbed [10], we
provide an analysis on real-world operational mea-
surements that further stresses the need for automated
anomaly detection in massive IoT networks.
2) We introduce four types of plausible anomalies gleaned
from our experimental observations, identify their symp-
toms from the application perspective and potential
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2underlying causes.
3) We study the performance of threshold- and machine
learning (ML)-based classifiers to detect the four types
of anomalies introduced. To achieve this, we train the
proposed classifiers with standard manually-engineered
features (data representations) and with an autoencoder-
based automatic feature generation approach, which
outperformed the former.
4) We also analyse the relative performance of three su-
pervised and three unsupervised ML techniques. More
explicitly, we consider regression-based, tree-based and
kernel-based methods as part of our supervised tech-
niques, while nearest neighbours, tree- and kernel-based
methods are leveraged as their unsupervised counterpart
techniques.
5) We produce a publicly available anomaly detection tool-
set1 including entire procedures, e.g., anomaly injection
into trace-sets, feature generation out of data represen-
tations, and model training and development.
This paper is structured as follows. Section II summarizes
the related work and Section III presents an analysis of
the real-world testbed measurements motivating our contri-
butions, while Section IV introduces the four types of IoT
network anomalies. Then, Section V elaborates on various
data representations that can be used to generate features
for training the proposed ML models, whereas Section VI
discusses the threshold-based approach as well as the selected
supervised and unsupervised ML techniques. Section VII de-
scribes the relevant methodological and experimental details,
while Section VIII provides thorough analyses of the results
and discusses the limitations. Finally, Section IX concludes
the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
We provide related work to the main contributions of this
paper as follows. First, we discuss related works that define
anomalies in wireless and IoT networks, then we stress on the
use of autoencoders for improving various aspects of wireless
networks including anomaly detection, and finally, we focus on
ML models that support for improved operations of wireless
networks.
A. Anomaly definitions in wireless networks
Generally speaking, an anomaly is defined as an outlier,
a distant object, an exception, a surprise, an aberration or
a peculiarity, depending on the domain, research community
and specific application scenario [9], [11]–[15]. A widely
used classification of anomalies, including in wireless sensor
network research is provided in [9], [16], where three classes
of anomalies are defined based on their nature; point anoma-
lies, contextual anomalies and collective anomalies. In [14],
Gupta et al. classify relevant studies on outlier detection
for time series data, one of which is the point outlier as
defined in [9], and others are subsequence outliers, global and
1Script for the design and development of anomaly detection models:
https://gist.github.com/gcerar/0b03e55f41147a7b7230f45d1f1209d6
local outliers. More recently, Lavin et al. [17] introduce a
benchmark for anomaly detection, and target mainly at cloud
networks and associated services, where they provide reference
datasets to be used when evaluating the performance of
anomaly detection algorithms. While they do not specifically
define the type of anomalies, their benchmark datasets include
several anomalies.
Due to the spatio-temporal nature of wireless sensor net-
work monitoring and data collection, Jurdak et al. [18] in-
troduce temporal, spatial and spatio-temporal anomalies as
well as node, network and data anomalies, followed by even
finer grained anomalies, such as node resets, node failures,
etc. A number of studies then introduce more focused and
application specific anomalies. For instance, Sheth et al. [6]
define and identify anomalies from the IEEE 802.11 phys-
ical layer perspective namely; hidden terminal, capture ef-
fect, noise and signal strength variation anomalies. Moreover,
Gupta et al. [7] define anomalies with the aspects of multihop
networking, such as black hole, sink hole, selective forwarding
and flooding, whereas Alipour et al. [8] define anomalies from
IEEE 802.11 link layer security aspects, such as injection test,
deauthentication attack, disassociation attack, association flood
and authentication flood. For further details, motivated readers
are referred to [18] for the diagnosis and detection of wireless
network anomalies.
B. Autoencoders for improving wireless network operations
and anomaly detection
With the advent of deep learning, one class of techniques
belonging to this class of ML, referred to as autoencoders, has
been proven to be particularly useful at performing automatic
feature engineering also for time series data [19]. Autoen-
coders attempts to learn a lossless compression of the data and
the code resulting from that compression represents a superior
feature set.
Generally in wireless, autoencoders have been successfully
applied by [20] and their subsequent works, such as [21] to
accurately reconstruct physical layer signals and [22] signal
denoising for more accurate localization. For anomaly detec-
tion in wireless and IoT networks, Wang et al. [23] proposed
autoencoders for more accurate identification of faulty parts of
WSNs, as well as faulty antennas in antenna arrays, whereas
Shahid et al. and Chen et al. [24], [25] proposed autoencoders
for identifying anomalies in wireless and IoT networks based
on transport layer traces, and recently, Yin et al. [26] proposed
recurrent autoencoders for time series anomaly detection for
IoT networks. However, they used a synthetic dataset with
metrics derived from several Yahoo services. Unlike the state-
of-the-art, this work proposes autoencoders as an automatic
feature generation method for link layer anomaly detection
and uses a real-world wireless dataset in which the introduced
four types of anomalies are synthetically injected.
C. ML techniques for wireless and IoT network anomaly
detection
In the literature, it is often a good practice that when
a ML solution to a specific problem is considered, several
3counterpart ML models are evaluated against each other for
performance analyses. For instance, Kieu et al. [19] compare
the performance of ten different ML techniques, such as Sup-
port Vector Machines, Local Outlier Factor, Isolation Forest,
just to name a few, on six different datasets that are suitable
for anomaly detection.
With respect to wireless and IoT network anomalies,
Thing et al. [27] evaluate the relative performance of four
deep learning and one decision tree models for anomaly
detection and attack classification in IEEE 802.11 networks,
whereas Chen et al. [25] evaluate the relative performance
of principal component analysis, standard and convolutional
autoencoder for detecting anomalies in transport layer traces,
i.e., TCP, UDP and ICMP of wireless networks. Moreover,
Ran et al. [28] evaluate the relative performance of their
proposed semi-supervised approach of IEEE.802.11 anomaly
detection, and similarly Salem et al. [29] evaluate the relative
performance of five ML techniques, i.e., SVM, decision trees
(J48), logistic regression, Naïve Bayes, and Decision Table
for anomaly detection in WSNs. Additionally, the previous
authors [30] also evaluate the performance of their proposed
algorithm against selected three ML techniques, namely lin-
ear regression, additive regression, and J48 decision tree
for anomaly detection in WSNs. However, in most of the
ML-based network anomaly detection research discussed in
this section as well as in [31] provide only limited relative
performance evaluation results. To the best of our knowledge,
this paper is the first attempt to provide relative comparisons
between three supervised and three unsupervised ML tech-
niques based on various data representations and their encoded
counterpart features.
III. MOTIVATION
Our lab runs the LOG-a-TEC 2 testbed that has empowered
wireless experimentation for more than ten years. The first
version of the testbed comprised of our custom embedded
platform [32] was mounted on public light poles in a small
municipality of Slovenia [33]. It included more than fifty
nodes, most of which were situated in hard-to-reach locations.
A sensor management system [10] is used to keep the record
of each node for its hardware and software versions, configu-
rations, and locations. This system also performs a number
of management and diagnosis related tasks to monitor the
operation of the devices.
Over time, the users of the testbed had difficulties in
reaching some of the nodes or noticed unexplainable mea-
surements collected during their testbed experimentation. For
instance, the transceivers on some of the nodes were degraded
significantly for their receiver sensitivity and transmit power
performances, and in some cases to such a degree that they
became inoperative. As depicted in Fig. 1a, third node (ID-
3) sensed transmissions from fifth node with received signal
strength indicator (RSSI) of about -70 [dBm] on average
till 2nd February of 2013. Following that, either fifth node’s
transmit power or third node’s receiver sensitivity was de-
graded significantly, which was reduced to about -90 [dBm]
2LOG-a-TEC testbed with sensor platforms http://log-a-tec.eu
on average. After investing a good amount of time and effort
in understanding and reproducing the anomaly, the fifth node
was diagnosed with a hardware failure, and it could only be
restored to normal operation by replacing the integrated circuit
for transceiver (TI CC2500).
Similarly, another anomaly type is experienced in Fig. 1b
with a sudden degradation and there were several recovery
attempts between February 15th and March 9th 2013. In
this particular case, we figured out that the sixth node was
accidentally downgraded in February to an older version of
the firmware that had a bug in the spectrum sensing code,
which directly affected the operations of the sixth node and
degraded its transmit power. Fig. 1c presents several spike-
like instantaneous degradation anomalies between nodes 12
and 15. We were not able to discover anything technically
wrong with these respective nodes. Therefore, we assumed that
these anomalies were probably due to weather and/or large
objects moving around the radios, since these two devices
were mounted in an industrial zone, where moving large
trucks and massive long-term standing objects were not an
uncommon occurrence, which can indeed incur spikes due
to the instantaneous non-line-of-sight channels experienced.
Finally, Fig. 1d also exhibits two distinguishable rapid drops
and climbs, but most importantly, on average, shows a slightly
degrading performance in sensitivity and/or transmit power
between nodes 4 and 26 after December 2012. We were not
able to readily justify such behaviour of the device, but ageing
of electronic components may induce such behaviour, which
is a well-known issue [34].
IV. WIRELESS NETWORK ANOMALIES
Wireless networks are designed to exchange data between
two communicating parties, e.g., video, voice and sensor mea-
surements. As long as the network remains functional and is
not interrupted, all the devices within the network are consid-
ered ordinarily operable. When the devices are compromised
as exemplified in Section III, then a degradation in the service
quality is experienced. The way how anomalies affect the
user’s service quality experience is stringently associated with
the type of anomaly. Therefore, in this section, we introduce
four types of anomalies that can be observed in communication
links of wireless networks, which were mainly discovered in
our evaluation of a real-world experimentation, as discussed
in Section III: a) sudden degradation, b) sudden degradation
with recovery, c) instantaneous degradation (spike) and d) slow
degradation.
a) Sudden degradation (SuddenD): The sudden degra-
dation anomaly can be mathematically represented by a step
function with decreasing slope, as depicted in Fig. 2a. In our
case, this represents a sudden persistent change in the state of
a link. While this sudden change with an increasing slope is
also possible in theory, typically it will only lead to a more
reliable link, therefore they are not accounted as an anomaly.
Symptom: From the perspective of a user, services may
become unavailable, offline and unreachable. From the per-
spective of a network, either the transmitter stops generating
electromagnetic field or the receiver is unable to receive data.
4(a) Sudden degradation with no recovery between Node 5 and Node 3. (b) Sudden degradation with recovery between Node 6 and Node 13.
(c) Spike-like instantaneous degradation between Node 13 and Node 15. (d) Slow degradation between Node 4 and Node 26.
Figure 1. Anomalies observed in operational environment, where solid black lines represent average RSSI and greyed areas show maximum/minimum values.
Possible causes: Such sudden degradation can be induced by
a transceiver failure as discussed in Section III and depicted
in Fig. 1a, a significant and sudden change in the position
of one or both of the communicating parties leading them
to remain disconnected, moving from line-of-sight to a non-
line-of-sight environment with obstacles preserving electro-
magnetic shielding materials, and a significant hardware or
software failure where built-in recovery mechanisms, such was
watchdogs cannot be triggered.
b) Sudden degradation with recovery (SuddenR): The
sudden degradation with recovery anomaly can be mathemat-
ically represented by a step function with decreasing slope, as
depicted in Fig. 2b. In this case, the state of a link suddenly
changes, stays in the new state for a longer period of time and
ultimately returns to the previous state. In sudden degradation
with recovery, communication is interrupted for a certain
period of time.
Symptom: From user’s perspective, provided services may
become sluggish and unavailable for a certain period of time
and later resume back to their regular operations. From the
perspective of the network, in the case of sudden degradation
with recovery, either transmitter temporarily stops generating
electromagnetic field or the receiver temporarily is unable to
receive it.
Possible causes: This type of degradation can be caused by
buffer congestion and software bug, as discussed in Section III
and depicted in Fig. 1b, where watchdog performs reboot
after a certain timeout, a radio remaining in excessive active
state and requiring recalibration, an obstacle blocking the
communication for some time, and a signal jammer equipped
on a military vehicle that is passing by.
c) Instantaneous degradation (InstaD): The instanta-
neous degradation anomaly can be mathematically represented
by a step function with steeply decreasing slope, forming a
sudden spike, as depicted in Fig. 2c. In this case, the state of
the link changes suddenly, but instantaneously returns to its
previous state. The instantaneous degradation anomaly may
appear as an information loss.
Symptoms: From user’s perspective, a real-time service may
experience instant lags, while other non-real-time services may
work unaffected. From the perspective of the network, either
transmitter experiences a deep fading instance or the receiver
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Figure 2. Visual representation of anomalies abbreviated as; a) SuddenD, b)
SuddenR, c) InstaD, d) SlowD.
becomes unable to receive data due to an instant exposure to
excessive noise or interference.
Possible causes: This type of degradation can be caused
by an instant interference, collision, quantization errors, value
reading errors or sudden saturations in the transceiver’s elec-
tronic components, as discussed in Section III and depicted
in Fig. 1c, where anomaly can be stringently induced by
the issues related to the propagation environment, such as
an external device communicating on the same frequency,
excessive background noise and multipath fading, just to name
a few.
d) Slow degradation (SlowD): The slow degradation
anomaly can be mathematically represented as a normalized
linear function with slightly decreasing slope, as depicted
in Fig. 2d. In this case, the state of the link undertakes
slight and unnoticeable changes for a longer period of time
and it may never resume to its original state. The slow
degradation anomaly may commence triggering information
loss and interruptions after a certain amount of time.
Symptom: Slow degradation anomaly could go unnoticed
for a very long time, where users may not even notice
any difference in service quality immediately. When relevant
thresholds are triggered, users commence experiencing deteri-
orated service quality. After employed compensation methods
are exhausted (e. g., buffers, queues, bandwidth preservation
strategies), communication may be interrupted and intended
services may become unavailable. From the perspective of
the network, either transmitter gradually stops generating
sufficient electromagnetic field to satisfy a received signal-
to-noise ratio threshold or the receiver is not able detect
or collect enough electromagnetic radiation to decode the
information, which can also be induced by the aging of
electronic components.
Possible causes: This type of degradation may be caused
by easier aging of electronic components in extreme working
conditions (e. g., high moisture and heat) as it is discussed
in Section III and depicted in Fig. 1d, where it reflects a
gradual but permanent impairment to the hardware or, slowly
increasing obstacle such as a building being slowly built or
vegetation growing.
V. DATA REPRESENTATION
Sections III and IV provided real-world anomaly examples
and formalized wireless link anomalies, respectively. In the
following, we provide five distinct ways to represent data for
a better understanding.
a) Time-value representation: The anomalies appearing
in time series of RSSI values and in Figs. 1 and 2 are recorded
as raw time-ordered values, thus forming a time series. We
refer to this time-ordered values as time-value representation.
In Figs. 3a, 4a, 5a and 6a, the time-value representation of an
ordinary link is depicted with solid black lines and its anomaly
injected counterpart, as per the definition from Section IV is
depicted with dashed red lines.
However, through mathematical transformations, time series
can be represented in other domains that, in some cases
may be more suitable for the analysis of anomaly or pattern
recognition. Motivated readers are referred to [35] for a com-
prehensive taxonomy of time series representation. In addition
to the time-value representation, in this study, we also consider
an aggregated representation, a histogram representation, a
frequency domain representation and an automatically encoded
representation.
b) Aggregated representation: This representation con-
tains seven statistical aggregates computed from the time-
valued representation, namely average, standard deviation, and
all five quantile (Q) values, such as zeroth quantile (minimum),
first quantile, second quantile (median), third quantile, and
fourth quantile (maximum). This representation is depicted in
Figs. 3b, 4b, 5b and 6b for each anomaly type, where they
present values belonging to middle quantiles (Q1-Q3) as a box
shape, first quantile (Q0-Q1) and third quantile (Q2-Q3) are
marked as separate whiskers on top and the bottom, median
value (Q2) is shown as a red bar within the box shape (–),
and finally, average is portrayed as a blue triangle shape (N).
c) Histogram representation: The histogram representa-
tion observed in Figs. 3c, 4c, 5c and 6c is performed via
splitting the range between (global) minimum and maximum
values into ten equally-sized bins. More explicitly, this rep-
resentation exhibits the percentage of values allotted in each
bin.
d) FFT representation: The frequency domain represen-
tation provided in Figs. 3d, 4d, 5d and 6d utilizes absolute
value of complex transformation, which is presented using log-
scale for better contrasting "with anomaly" scenario against the
"no anomaly" one.
e) Encoded representation: A recent revolution of deep
learning techniques, namely autoencoders, exhibits great per-
formance returns in a diverse set of problems. To contrast
against the above-mentioned traditional representations, we
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Figure 3. Distinct representations of the data for sudden degradation anomaly (SuddenD).
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Figure 4. Distinct representations of the data for sudden degradation with recovery anomaly (SuddenR).
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Figure 5. Distinct representations of the data for spike-like instantaneous degradation anomaly (InstaD).
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Figure 6. Distinct representations of the data for slow degradation anomaly (SlowD).
propose automatically generated encoded (autoencoder) rep-
resentations for all anomaly types introduced in Section IV.
Autoencoders [16], [36], [37] are neural networks which are
trained to generate a representation from the reduced encoding
that is very similar compared its original input. The middle
layer of an autoencoder is depicted with the purple circles in
Fig. 7 containing the reduced version of the input data and is
referred to as a code h whose size is expected to be smaller
than the size of the input data. As portrayed in Fig. 7, an
autoencoder is composed of two parts; i) an encoder function
h = f (x), and ii) a decoder function producing a reconstruction
xˆ = g(h). The autoencoders thus learn to include only the
most useful signals from the input data, while mitigating the
unnecessary signal noise.
An undercomplete autoencoder, where code size is smaller
than input size, with nonlinear activation functions presents
a generalized form of principal component analysis (PCA).
Through the training process, the error between input x and
output xˆ becomes negligible. Consequently, neural network
learns a new representation of the input data, within a re-
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Figure 7. Illustration of autoencoder configuration during training process.
duced feature-space. For example, in Fig. 8a we transform
time-value representation containing 300 dimensions into a
newly encoded representation having only 4 dimensions.
Figs. 8a, 8b, 8c, and 8d present scenarios for a link with
both; i) ordinary (non-anomalous) data , ii) anomaly injected
(anomalous) data for SuddenD, SuddenR, InstaD and SlowD
anomalies, respectively. Non-anomalous link is depicted with
a solid black line, whereas anomalous link is marked with a
dashed red line.
VI. APPROACHES FOR AUTOMATED DETECTION OF
ANOMALIES
Considering the link anomalies defined in Section IV and
their corresponding representations depicted in Figs. 3, 4, 5
and 6, it is clear that setting predefined thresholds for the
investigated data would enable the detection of abnormal
measurements and aid in treating them as an outlier. However,
it has been proven that since fixed threshold-based approaches
do not adapt to fluctuating behaviour of the data, selecting
a threshold becomes consequential and thus may lead to
poor performance, especially in real-time prediction applica-
tions [38]. On the contrary, adaptive and proactive approaches,
such as deep learning neural network (DNN) and recurrent
neural network (RNN) [38], can learn from regular patterns
of the data and accurately identify abnormal behaviours to
enable more accurate anomaly detection.
A. Threshold based detection
Considering Fig. 2a, detecting SuddenD requires the diag-
nosis of steep falling slopes that do not recover for a relatively
long, possibly predefined, period of time. Detecting SuddenR
amounts to the identification of a sudden drop and later a
boost in signal that resumes back to the original strength level
within a predefined time window. SuddenR and InstaD are
somewhat similar from application perspective. However, the
distinction lies in the length of the time window at which the
signal recovers back to its original levels within an instant of
the time for InstaD. Detecting SlowD requires the diagnosis
of a slowly but rather consistently falling slope for a relatively
long, possibly predefined time window.
The time-value rules are a straightforward way to approach
link-level anomaly detection. These rules may either be set
based on an experienced arbitrary threshold or they can be
identified using a theoretical or numerical method. However,
as discussed in Section V, there are various possible ways to
detect anomalies. For instance, it can be seen on Figs. 3b, 4b
and 6b that RSS distribution of an average healthy link is
significantly different than the RSS distribution of the same
link when anomaly is injected, which is readily distinguishable
for SuddenD, SuddenR and SlowD anomalies at a glance.
More explicitly, the spread of RSS for the anomaly injected
link is wider, and its mean and median values are overwritten
accordingly. Similar conclusions can be made for the respec-
tive histograms in Figs. 3c, 4c and 6c. However, abnormal
distributions in SlowD anomaly can only be detected with
long-term observations. Moreover, sudden changes in time
series can also be detected in frequency domain, which in our
case, are readily observed for SuddenD and SuddenR anoma-
lies as larger magnitudes at lower frequencies in Figs. 3b
and 4b, respectively. Changes due to injected anomalies are
almost indistinguishable in the case of InstaD and SlowD
while leveraging frequency domain.
Details of the threshold strategy are provided in Sec-
tion VIII. For time-value perspective, we consider D’Agostino-
Pearson’s normality statistical test [39], [40]. The test assesses
whether certain set of points come from normal distribution
or not. If the p value is below threshold, it is likely that the
measurements do not come from normal distribution. Notice
that Pearson’s normality test is not sufficient condition for
normality claims. Although, the approach may work fine for
our limited line-of-sight scenario, it will not work for mobile
or non line of sight scenario. For aggregated perspective, we
consider for a link to have an anomaly two separate criteria.
One criterion is based on the difference between mean and
median values, which (if we assume normal distribution) are
fairly close. The second criterion is how much can values
deviate in standard deviation. Either of them has to be true
for a link to be marked to have an anomaly. For histogram
perspective, we define and arbitrary threshold. Anything below
that is marked as an anomaly.
B. Machine learning-based detection
A ML model is expected to distinguish between anomalous
and ordinary behaviours of a link, thus requires to solve a
binary classification problem. There are two ways to train
a ML model to identify such distinctions. The first one is
based on a supervised training approach where all anomaly
data are labelled, although in many practical applications,
producing a reliable training dataset is expensive and it can
inevitably cover only the type of anomalies that are present in
the training dataset, which then cannot cope with the abnormal
link behaviours in a comprehensive manner. For this reason,
training a ML model in an unsupervised way is more practical,
where learning from patterns of the overall link operations so
as to distinguish the abnormal behaviours of a link from the
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Figure 8. Automatically generated features (code) exemplified for time-value representations.
anticipated behaviours is provoked, which is referred to as
the automated detection of an outlier [41] or an anomaly [16]
using ML models.
In addition to baseline threshold-based approach discussed
in Section VI-A, we also consider three supervised and three
unsupervised ML techniques as elaborated in the following
sections.
1) Supervised approaches: To evaluate the performance of
selected supervised ML techniques against each other and
against the threshold-based approach, we opt for a set of
candidate supervised approaches leveraging one representative
technique from three different classes: i) Logistic Regression
from Regression Analysis [42], ii) Random Forest from tree
ensemble class [43] and iii) Support Vector Machines (SVM)
from kernel-method class [43].
Logistic Regression [42] is a modified linear regression
able to work on classification problems. In linear regression
the goal is to fit a line to data samples and minimize loss.
Similarly, logistic regression aims for fitting sigmoid function
with the goal to minimize loss at predicting any two classes.
Logistic regression also includes a generalized form suitable
for high-dimensional input data and multi-class rather than
binary classification.
Random Forests [44] is an ensemble method that uses
a number of decision tree classifiers followed by a voting
mechanisms to perform multi-class classification. The trees are
learnt by randomly splitting a relatively large feature space
into smaller subspaces. Each tree provides a class in which
a specific data point falls into, the class corresponds to the
"vote" of that tree. The final outcome of the classifier then
uses a mechanism, such as majority voting to provide the final
result.
Support Vector Machine [45] is a learning algorithm that
belongs to the family of kernel methods. Roughly speaking,
SVMs attempt to learn a hyperplane that best splits a set of
data into two classes. The shape of the hyperplane depends on
the type of kernel function selected for the algorithm. When
the kernel function is linear, so is the learnt hyperplane. When
non-linear kernels are chosen, for instance RBF kernel [46],
then the hyperplane is non-linear therefore better suited to
approximate or discriminate non-linear random variables.
2) Unsupervised approaches: The cost of producing la-
bels for supervised learning is discussed in Section VI-B.
As a countermeasure, we also consider a set of candidate
unsupervised approaches for developing anomaly detection
models [43], where we leverage one representative technique
from three different classes: i) Local Outlier Factor from
Nearest Neighbour (NN) class [43], ii) Isolation Forest from
tree ensemble class [43] and iii) one-class Support Vector
Machines (SVM) from kernel-method class [43].
Local Outlier Factor [47] belongs to the k-Nearest Neigh-
bour (kNN) family of algorithms, which rely on the computa-
tion of the distance between data points of the feature space.
The feature vectors with smaller distance are alike and thus
clustered together. One drawback for this family of algorithms
is that as the dimensionality of the training data grows,
the computational complexity evolves exponentially. However,
there have been attempts in circumventing this exponential
complexity, e. g., Ball Tree.
Isolation Forest [48] belongs to tree-based ensemble meth-
ods, and works in a roughly similar way as Random Forests
as described above. Essentially, it represents a Random Forest
adapted so that it optimizes outlier detection rather than multi-
class classification of majority of data it sees. Based on certain
metrics and distinct criteria, the algorithm decides whether
particular subspaces contain any abnormal samples, namely
anomalies.
Support Vector Machine, as described at the end of super-
vised approaches, can also be used in an unsupervised mode
for anomaly detection. In fact, most ML techniques can be
used in both supervised and unsupervised mode. With this
one-class approach, the model is expected to distinguish data
as negative or positive instances. Then, the model can learn
the boundaries of the data so as to detect the points that lie
outside the boundary exposed as anomalies or outliers.
VII. METHODOLOGY AND EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS
Before we proceed with the analysis of the relative per-
formance of the wireless link anomaly detection approaches
proposed in this paper, we provide relevant methodological
and experimental details.
A. Training dataset generation
For our experimental evaluation, we consider a real-world
measurement dataset, i.e., Rutgers [49], which contains mea-
surements from 29 nodes at 5 different noise levels and each
record has 300 measurements. Although every link is mea-
sured at five different noise levels, we consider each recording
as a different link and we assume that there is no correlation.
9On this existing real-world dataset we synthetically inject the
four types of anomalies proposed in this paper as follows.
First, we only pick the links without packet loss. This reduces
our dataset from 4 060 to 2 123 (≈ 52%) of independent links.
Second, by means of applying one anomaly type at a time, we
randomly pick 33% of these links, at which the anomaly is
injected according to guidelines in Table I, while the remaining
is left intact.
Table I
ARTIFICIAL ANOMALY INJECTIONS FOR EACH ANOMALY SCENARIO.
Type Links Affected Appearance Persistence
SuddenD
2 123 33% (700)
once, [200th, 280th] for ∞
SuddenR once, [25th, 275th] for [5, 20]
InstaD on ≈1% of a link for 1 datapoint
SlowD once, [1st, 20th] for [150, 180]†
† RSSI(x, start) ← RSSI(x) + min(0, −rand(0.5, 1.5) · (x − start))
The suddenD anomaly, observed in Fig. 2a, on the affected
link appears arbitrarily between 200th and 280th packet and it
persists indefinitely. In case of suddenR, observed in Fig. 2b,
anomaly applied on the link appears only once with a random
start from 25th to 275th packet, where it persists for an
arbitrary duration between 5 to 20 measurements. For InstaD
of Fig. 2c, the anomaly can appear anywhere in the entire
series with 0.01 probability, which means that each anomaly
on the affected link appears three times on average. Finally,
SlowD anomaly of Fig. 2d appears arbitrarily between 1st
and 20th measurements, where it commences with a random
degrading pace of duration between 150 and 280 packets. In
a nutshell, anomaly injection details are provided in Table I.
Table II
AUTOENCODER CONFIGURATIONS.
Role Layer Notes
Encoder
Input(*)
Dense(128)
BN + LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
Dense(64)
BN + LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
Dense(32)
BN + LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
Dense(4) no activation
Decoder
Input(4)
Dense(32)
BN + LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
Dense(64)
BN + LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
Dense(128)
BN + LeakyReLU(α = 0.2)
Dense(*) no activation
* input/output size depends on feature vector
- Implementation of autoencoders in TensorFlow/Keras is available at:
https://gist.github.com/gcerar/5e4e53902493632a3cfb5cc06c3317b7
B. Computing standard and encoded representations
Once anomalies are injected as specified in Table I, we com-
pute four different data representations described in Section V.
The first one, namely time-value representation of Section V-
a, converts each link into a single feature vector containing
300 features. The second one, the so-called aggregated feature,
summarizes each link with 7 features, which are described
in Section V-b. The third one, namely histogram feature dis-
cussed in Section V-c, defines ten equally spaced bins, which
are then presented to a model as a feature vector containing 10
features. The forth one, namely frequency feature elaborated
in Section V-d, gives the model a large feature vector of
frequency-domain representation summing up to nearly 150
features. As we compute four representations for each of the
four types of anomalies, we generate 16 candidate datasets.
Next, we also consider autoencoders for each anomaly
scenario and each of the four standard representations. As
any other deep neural network, autoencoder also requires
many iterations of training. To produce credible results with
autoencoder, we build the generic model in two steps. In the
first step, we split the dataset into training and test groups
with a 60:40 ratio, respectively. In the second step, when
the weights of the autoencoder are converged, we perform an
end-to-end evaluation on the test group. Relevant autoencoder
configurations are provided in Table II, where the layers and
their required parameters are outlined for the encoder and the
decoder. Although recent trends in DNNs go towards the use
of convolutional layers, a convolution layer would make sense
only in case of time-value and frequency perspective, due
to their reasonable size and correlated neighbouring vector
values. Therefore, our decision is to go with fully connected
(dense) layers. For the activation part, we use batch normal-
ization (BN) followed by Leaky Rectified Linear Unit (leaky
ReLU, or LReLU) with α = 0.2 coefficient for negative values.
While plain ReLU is most widely used non-linear activation
function, its leaky version has shown several benefits and
minor overall improvements [50].
To produce the encoded representations, we feed the 16
datasets corresponding to the representation provided in Sec-
tions V-(a),(b),(c),(d) into the autoencoder, resulting in addi-
tional 16 candidate datasets. Therefore, to continue with the
anomaly detection, we train both supervised and unsupervised
ML models on a total of 32 datasets, 16 corresponding to the
four standard representations of each anomaly and the other
16 corresponding to the encoded representations.
C. Performing automatic anomaly detection
Next, we compute the performance of the threshold, three
supervised and three unsupervised ML techniques described
in Section VI on the 32 generated datasets corresponding to
the proposed anomalies and representations. Each approaches’
output is compared to a label to identify whether the link
actually contains anomalies or not.
a) Threshold approach: Descriptive details of leveraging
certain thresholds for each anomaly can be found in Sec-
tion VI-A. The utilized experimental threshold parameters are
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Table III
PREDETERMINED ANOMALY THRESHOLDS.
Features Anomaly thresholds
Time-series Normality test [39], [40], when p < 10−3
Aggregated ( |mean - median | > 3 dB) OR (2·stdev > 2.5 dB)
Histogram RSSI < -85 dBm
Figure 9. Regularization parameter (C) search for selecting the best perform-
ing model that is, for example, trained using LR on time-value representation
for SuddenD anomalies and based on robust scaler.
listed in Table III. The threshold for the time-series represen-
tation that uses the D’Agostino-Pearson’s normality statistical
test [39], [40] is p < 10−3. The threshold for the aggregated
representation assumes the absolute difference between mean
and median is higher than 3dB or that the double of the
standard deviation is higher than 2.5dB. The threshold for
the histogram representation is set at RSSI < −85dBm while
threshold selection for the FFT and encoded representations
were infeasible to find using our trial-and-error approach. The
differences in the FFT representation are not easily visible or
detectable using simple methods while the encoded represen-
tations cannot be easily interpreted, therefore also deriving an
appropriate threshold is not possible.
b) Machine learning-based approaches: For each of the
six selected ML techniques, we use standard ML cross-
validation3. We train the models using shuffled data split
into training and test sets with a 80:20 ratio, respectively.
Model is trained with the training set and evaluated using
the test set in order to ensure credible results. We use
standard metrics for evaluating classifiers: precision, recall
and F1 score. Precision measures how many of the instances
detected as class A actually belong to class A, expressed
as; Precision = TPTP+FP , whereas recall measures how many
of the instances belonging to class A were actually detected,
expressed as; Recall = TPTP+FN , where TP, FP and FN stand for
true positives, false positives and false negatives, respectively.
F1 score is quantified by the harmonic mean of the precision
3Stratified K-Fold cross validation is implemented by using StratifiedKFold
parameter in Python Scikit Learn toolbox https://scikit-learn.org/stable/
and the recall, where larger values indicate better classifiers
with balanced and higher precision and recall performances.
For each of the ML techniques selected in Section VI,
Table IV lists the respective implementations and parameters
used in the experiments. For instance, for logistic regression
we use the LogisticRegression implementation available in
the Python Scikit Learn toolbox4. As the LogisticRegression
implementation enables setting 12 different parameters that
influence the final model, we generally select standard values
that have been proven to work on large number of cases
and datasets by the ML community. However, we identify
selected parameters that should be optimized, such as the
regularization strength C in this case. We search for the
best configuration by adapting an array of possible values
C ∈ [10−3, 10−2, 10−1, 100, 101, 102] and ultimately select the
best performing regularization factor C among them. For
instance, Fig. 9 presents the scenario where a model is trained
using LR on time-value representation for SuddenD anomalies
and based on robust scaler. For this particular scenario, the best
F1 score of this model is attained by means of setting C to
any value that is larger than 1. For the results presented in the
next sections, we only account for the best F1 scores obtained
after searching for such near-optimal regularization parameter
values.
The implementations chosen for the remaining algorithms
also include over ten possible input parameters. For LOF, we
vary the number of neighbours, algorithm and leaf size for
finding the best performing model. For RForest and IForest,
we vary the number of base estimators, whereas for SVM and
OC-SVM, we vary the regularization factor C, the kernel and
the kernel coefficient gamma for the rb f kernel, respectively.
As some of the models are sensitive to scaling, we also
consider training on data that is; i) not scaled, ii) scaled
by using mean values, iii) scaled using mean and deviation,
and iv) scaled using min-max. The entire procedure and
parameters can be readily found and used in the existing public
open source repository5. Six selected ML techniques with the
associated parameter tuning are trained over the 32 datasets,
totalling at more than 40,000 anomaly detection models.
VIII. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the relative performance of
various data representations discussed in Section V and of
approaches discussed in Section VI for detecting four types
of anomalies introduced in Section IV. The methodological
and experimental details utilized for obtaining the results are
elaborated in Section VII.
A. Performance analyses of data representations
The best performing results with respect to the F1 score are
presented in Table V for SuddenD and SuddenR, Table VI for
InstaD and Table VII for SlowD. The results for SuddenD and
SuddenR anomaly types are presented in one table as there are
4https://scikit-learn.org/stable/
5Script for the design and development of anomaly detection models
excluding data preprocessing is available at:
https://gist.github.com/gcerar/0b03e55f41147a7b7230f45d1f1209d6
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Table IV
ML TECHNIQUES AND THEIR RELEVANT PARAMETERS.
Approach Technique Implementation Parameters and their range
Supervised
Logistic Regression LogisticRegression penalty=’l2’, dual=False, tol=1e-4, C= (1e-3, 1e-2, 1e-1, 1.0, 10., 100.) fit_intercept=True,
(LR) from sklearn intercept_scaling=1, class_weight=None, solver=’lbfgs’, l1_ratio=None
Random Forest BaggingClassifier base_estimator=None, n_estimators=[10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 70, 100], max_samples=1.0,
(RForest) from sklearn max_features=1.0, oob_score=False, intercept_scaling=1,
Support Vector SVC C=(1e-3, 1e-2, 1e-1, 1.0, 10., 100.), kernel=(’linear’, ’rbf’), gamma=(’auto’, ’scale’),
Machine (SVM) from sklearn tol=1e-3, decision_function_shape=’ovr’, break_ties=False
Unsupervised
Local Outlier LocalOutlierFactor n_neighbors=[5, 10, 20, 40, 50, 80], algorithm=[’ball_tree’, ’kd_tree’, ’brute’],
Factor (LOF) from sklearn leaf_size=[10, 30, 50, 80], p=[1, 2] metric_params=None, contamination="auto",
Isolation Forest IsolationForest n_estimators=[10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 70, 100], max_samples=’auto’, contamination=’auto’,
(IForest) from sklearn max_features=1.0, bootstrap=False,
Support Vector OneClassSVM nu=[0.10, 0.3, 0.5, 0.70, 0.90, 1.0], kernel=(’linear’, ’rbf’), gamma=(’auto’, ’scale’),
Machine (OC-SVM) from sklearn coef0=0.0, tol=1e-3,
hardly any differences between their F1 scores in the first two
decimals. The first column of the tables lists the approach,
the second column outlines the used ML techniques, while
columns 3 to 6 list the results for time-valued, aggregated,
histogram and FFT representations.
The encoded representation discussed in Section V-d and
extracted according to the specifications in Section VIII-a
are inserted as rows where the name of the ML technique
includes the word "Encoder". More precisely, when looking at
the row corresponding to the ML technique, say IForest, the
performance results refer to the four mentioned representations
for the IForest ML technique. When looking at the row entitled
"Encoder + IF", the numerical results refer to the IForest ML
technique that is applied to the codes generated from the four
representations, respectively. Finally, the superscripts identify
the scaling methods utilized. The three highest F1 scores for
supervised approaches and the three highest F1 scores for
unsupervised are emphasized with bold font.
It can be seen from the first two tables, Tables V and VI,
for the first three anomaly types, namely SuddenD, SuddenR
and InstaD, that all have in common very steep changes in
values that the encoded time-valued representations, followed
by the encoded frequency domain representations, yield the
best F1 scores. For SuddenD and SuddenR, the highest F1
scores are 0.77 to 0.74 for the supervised approaches and 0.63
to 0.60 for the unsupervised ones. For InstaD, the highest F1
scores are 0.76 to 0.74 for the supervised approaches and 0.74
to 0.64 for the unsupervised ones. All standard non-encoded
representations as well as encoded representations computed
from aggregated or histogram features yield significantly lower
F1 scores of up to 0.44.
The results demonstrate that, for degradations that include
steep changes, the autoencoder seems to be able to produce,
from the raw data or its harmonic representation, an encoding
that preserves the steep change and enables both supervised
and unsupervised approaches to detect it with a relatively
higher F1 score compared to its counterpart non-encoded
representations. However, when the raw data is summarized
or transformed into a significantly smaller dimensional rep-
resentation, such as a 10 bin histogram or an 8 number of
aggregated summary, useful information is lost and therefore
the autoencoder cannot generate a code with sufficient signal
for the learning methods.
From Table VII, it can be observed that for the SlowD
anomaly type that introduces very slow changes in the time-
series, all representations, both standard and encoded, yield
very high F1 scores with values above 0.95 for the supervised
approach, while encoded features computed on time-series
and histogram features seem to have an advantage over other
standard and encoded representations with F1 scores from 0.98
to 0.85.
In a nutshell, autoencoders produce superior features com-
pared to the non-encoded representations for all anomaly
types. The results suggest that it is better to use collected
data, without any pre-processing, such as summarization or
dimensionality reduction (i.e., statistical aggregates or his-
tograms) as an input to the autoencoder which conforms with
the findings of anomaly detection on time-series data [19],
[51]. The trade-off, between that the code compressing the data
sufficiently well to be able to reconstruct it, and to preserve
enough particularities in the compressed form so that a model
is able to efficiently learn from, is crucial. Additionally, for
the cases where a time-domain representation is not available,
for instance when the hardware produces only a frequency
domain representation, our proposed ML techniques using
autoencoders will also perform well.
B. Performance analyses of the approaches
It is demonstrated in Tables V, VI and VII that the SlowD
can be detected more accurately on our wireless anomalies
dataset with very high F1 scores of up to 1.0, while other
anomalies can be detected with F1 scores of up to 0.77. Unless
stated otherwise, performance analysis are realized based on
F1 scores.
SuddenD and SuddenR anomalies: According to Ta-
ble V, the supervised models are able to detect SuddenD and
SuddenR anomalies more accurately than the unsupervised
models, and most models yield higher performance using the
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Table V
PERFORMANCE OF DETECTING SUDDEN DEGRADATION (SUDDEND) AND SUDDEN DEGRADATION WITH RECOVERY (SUDDENR) ANOMALIES.
Approach Technique
time-value features aggregated features histogram features7 frequency domain
Prec. Rec. F1 Prec. Rec. F1 Prec. Rec. F1 Prec. Rec. F1
Baseline Threshold (Tab. III) 0.27 0.19 0.221 0.25 0.01 0.021 0.27 0.48 0.351 - - -
Supervised
LR 0.28 0.18 0.225 1.00 0.00 0.005 0.80 0.01 0.011 0.30 0.07 0.121
encoder + LR 0.81 0.73 0.773 0.67 0.00 0.015 1.00 0.00 0.015 0.79 0.54 0.654
RForest 0.38 0.12 0.184 0.27 0.14 0.182 0.28 0.20 0.241 0.30 0.07 0.113
encoder + RForest 0.82 0.71 0.763 0.28 0.19 0.234 0.36 0.21 0.274 0.81 0.68 0.743
SVM 0.29 0.56 0.395,7 0.30 0.64 0.415,7 0.30 0.61 0.406,7 0.30 0.49 0.371,7
encoder + SVM 0.88 0.69 0.773,8 0.29 0.75 0.422,7 0.29 0.78 0.422,7 0.85 0.70 0.763,8
Unsupervised
LOF 0.29 0.67 0.414 0.31 0.28 0.301 0.33 0.24 0.271 0.37 0.03 0.051
encoder + LOF 0.44 0.08 0.142 0.32 0.22 0.264 0.31 0.17 0.221 0.42 0.06 0.115
IForest 0.29 0.15 0.201 0.29 0.30 0.301 0.28 0.47 0.355 0.33 0.11 0.163
encoder + IForest 0.81 0.49 0.613 0.26 0.32 0.282 0.29 0.47 0.361 0.75 0.51 0.603
OC-SVM 0.28 1.00 0.445,7 0.28 0.99 0.441,8 0.28 0.96 0.445,7 0.29 0.92 0.444,8
encoder + OC-SVM 0.62 0.65 0.632,7 0.28 1.00 0.445,7 0.28 1.00 0.445,7 0.46 0.82 0.594,8
Table VI
PERFORMANCE OF DETECTING SPIKE (INSTAD) ANOMALIES.
Approach Technique
time-value features aggregated features histogram features7 frequency domain
Prec. Rec. F1 Prec. Rec. F1 Prec. Rec. F1 Prec. Rec. F1
Baseline Threshold (Tab. III) 0.37 0.32 0.351 0.28 0.01 0.031 0.27 0.51 0.361 - - -
Supervised
LR 0.29 0.18 0.222 0.69 0.27 0.393 0.80 0.01 0.011 0.29 0.09 0.142
encoder + LR 0.81 0.68 0.742 0.72 0.28 0.403 0.75 0.01 0.011 0.78 0.55 0.646
RForest 0.29 0.10 0.152 0.53 0.36 0.434 0.27 0.20 0.231 0.34 0.07 0.122
encoder + RForest 0.80 0.69 0.743 0.53 0.37 0.444 0.28 0.20 0.241 0.80 0.66 0.723
SVM 0.28 0.46 0.345,7 0.32 0.72 0.444,7 0.26 0.81 0.394,7 0.28 0.56 0.381,7
encoder + SVM 0.86 0.69 0.763,8 0.63 0.33 0.444,8 0.26 0.73 0.381,7 0.82 0.69 0.753,8
Unsupervised
LOF 0.28 0.67 0.404 0.33 0.32 0.334 0.32 0.23 0.271 0.38 0.03 0.051
encoder + LOF 0.35 0.11 0.173 0.27 0.22 0.241 0.31 0.18 0.231 0.51 0.09 0.153
IForest 0.25 0.15 0.191 0.31 0.27 0.294 0.28 0.33 0.305 0.28 0.13 0.182
encoder + IForest 0.84 0.67 0.743 0.55 0.34 0.425 0.26 0.52 0.355 0.77 0.50 0.613
OC-SVM 0.27 1.00 0.433,8 0.27 0.98 0.421,8 0.27 1.00 0.431,7 0.28 0.94 0.431,8
encoder + OC-SVM 0.67 0.73 0.703,8 0.31 0.76 0.445,7 0.27 1.00 0.431,7 0.61 0.68 0.643,8
encoded representations. All three supervised models have
comparable F1 scores of 0.77-0.74 on encoded time-value
and FFT representations that are well above the threshold
approach. LR performs similar to the threshold model on time-
series and aggregated representations while on the histogram
representation performs well below the threshold. RForest
performs better than LR on aggregated and histogram rep-
resentations and comparably on time-values and frequency
domain representations. SVM performs the best of the three
and above the threshold on all four standard representations.
The F1 scores of the unsupervised approaches on SuddenD
and SuddenR anomalies are 0.63 to 0.6 with SVM yielding
the best overall performance both on standard and encoded
representations followed by RForest while LOF yields unre-
markable outcomes.
Further consideration of the precision and recall in Table V
for the best performing models with the highest F1 scores
for SuddenD and SuddenR anomalies, reveals that in general
precision is up to 50% higher than recall. For instance, the
supervised encoder+SVM model on time-valued features has
a precision of 0.88 and a recall of 0.69. This means that 88% of
the links detected as anomalous are actually truly anomalous
according to our definition and only the remaining 12% have
been detected as anomalous while they are actually ordinary
links. In other words, the ratio of true positive detection of that
model is quite high. However, the lower recall means that only
69% of the anomalous links from the test data have been cor-
rectly detected as anomalous, while the remaining is classified
as ordinary links. The ratio of links detected as true positive to
the overall positives existing in the test data, represented by the
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Table VII
PERFORMANCE OF DETECTING SLOW DEGRADATION (SLOWD) ANOMALIES.
Approach Technique
time-value features aggregated features histogram features7 frequency domain
Prec. Rec. F1 Prec. Rec. F1 Prec. Rec. F1 Prec. Rec. F1
Baseline Threshold (Tab. III) 0.17 0.10 0.131 0.49 0.03 0.061 0.31 0.57 0.401 - - -
Supervised
LR 0.97 0.94 0.961 0.52 0.22 0.311 0.97 0.99 0.985 0.92 0.91 0.924
encoder + LR 0.98 0.98 0.984 0.98 1.00 0.993 1.00 1.00 1.006 0.96 0.97 0.974
RForest 0.99 0.97 0.984 0.98 0.99 0.994 1.00 0.99 0.996 0.92 0.94 0.935
encoder + RForest 0.98 0.98 0.984 0.98 0.99 0.993 1.00 1.00 1.006 0.98 0.94 0.966
SVM 0.98 0.94 0.964,8 0.96 0.98 0.974,8 0.99 1.00 1.006,8 0.93 0.95 0.945,8
encoder + SVM 0.98 0.98 0.984,8 0.98 1.00 0.993,8 1.00 1.00 1.006,8 0.96 0.97 0.974,8
Unsupervised
LOF 0.30 0.44 0.362 0.31 0.23 0.261 0.33 0.24 0.281 0.62 0.03 0.051
encoder + LOF 0.34 0.09 0.146 0.41 0.15 0.224 0.53 0.08 0.144 0.54 0.08 0.136
IForest 0.34 0.20 0.251 0.35 0.28 0.311 0.40 0.15 0.214 0.33 0.20 0.254
encoder + IForest 0.83 0.91 0.873 0.19 0.18 0.181 0.46 0.36 0.414 0.48 0.44 0.464
OC-SVM 0.31 0.98 0.475,8 0.30 0.96 0.466,7 0.97 0.99 0.985,7 0.36 0.88 0.515,7
encoder + OC-SVM 0.56 0.99 0.722,8 0.72 0.77 0.741,7 0.75 0.99 0.855,7 0.49 0.88 0.634,8
1 No-scaling
2 Only mean scaling (by standard scaler)
3 Mean and deviation scaling (by standard scaler)
4 Only mean scaling (by robust scaler with respect to values between Q25 and Q75)
5 Mean and deviation scaling (by robust scaler with respect to values between Q25 and Q75)
6 Min-Max scaler
7 Linear kernel
8 RBF kernel
recall, is lower than the precision by 19 percentage points for
the supervised encoder+SVM model on time-valued features.
For the case of unsupervised encoder+IForest model on time-
valued features, the difference between precision and recall
is 32 percentage points meaning that most of the detected
anomalous links are actually anomalous, albeit the detected
anomalous links over the total anomalous links are only 40%.
On the other hand, Table V presents that for the case of
unsupervised encoder+IForest model on time-valued features,
the precision and recall performances exhibit a tiny margin
with a precision of 0.62 and a recall of 0.65.
Having faced with the choice of selecting one of the two
unsupervised models, one would need to decide what is more
important for the application; i) how precisely the model de-
tects anomalous links (high precision) or ii) how many relevant
anomalous links were detected (high recall). For a precise
model, one would select unsupervised encoder+SVM model
on time-valued features, while for a well-balanced detection
performance, opting for unsupervised encoder+IForest model
on time-valued features would be plausible.
InstaD anomalies: According to Table VI, the supervised
and unsupervised models exhibit comparable performance in
detecting InstaD anomalies, and most models yield higher per-
formance using the encoded representations. The best models,
i.e., LR, RForest, SVM, IForest and OC-SVM have compa-
rable F1 scores of 0.76-0.70 on encoded time-value and FFT
representations that are well above the threshold approach. All
models trained for InstaD anomaly show relatively modest
performance on encoded aggregated and encoded histogram
representations as well as on the four standard representations.
Considering precision and recall in Table VI for the best
performing models with highest F1 scores for InstaD anoma-
lies show that the precision is up to 25% higher than recall
score. First important notice is that all the best performing
models (based on F1 score) are trained either on time-value
or FFT representations, while in general aggregated and his-
togram representations perform poorly for InstaD anomalies.
For instance, in general, OC-SVM and encoder+OC-SVM
models on aggregated and histogram representations exhibit
similar performances. Those four models perform a precision
of around 28% and mostly a recall of about 100%. This
indicates that models were able to detect almost all anomalous
links, however, low precision points that the models have high
false positive rate of detection. More explicitly, while models
were able to find almost all anomalous links, out of all the
marked samples as anomalous, labels were incorrectly placed
in 72% of the cases.
If the application requires a selection of one of the two
unsupervised models, one would select either unsupervised
encoder+IForest or encoder+OC-SVM models on time-valued
features for a better precision performance considering that
they both perform an F1 score within a tiny margin of 4
percentage points.
SlowD anomalies: According to Table VII, all three
supervised models are able to detect SlowD anomalies with
very high F1 scores of 1.0 to 0.98. While LR and SVM
attain this performance only on the encoded representations,
RForest based models are also able to achieve similar perfor-
mances with the standard representations. The best performing
unsupervised ML model is OC-SVM on histogram features
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with F1 = 0.98, followed by IForest on encoded time-value
representation with F1 = 0.87 and by OC-SVM on the
encoded histogram representation F1 = 0.85. Contrarily, LOF
yields relatively modest performance for SlowD.
Looking at the precision and recall performances in Ta-
ble VII for the best performing models with the highest
F1 scores for SlowD, recall performs up to 20% higher
than the precision performance. For instance, the unsuper-
vised encoder+IForest model on time-valued features has a
precision of 0.83 and a recall of 0.91. Another interesting
observation is that using autoencoder significantly improves
the performance of SlowD models for all performance metrics
apart from the LOF model. For instance, the most significant
improvement for unsupervised approaches is for the unsuper-
vised encoder+IForest on time-valued features, where encoder
improved the precision for almost 250%, from 0.34 to 0.83
and the recall for more than 450%, from 0.20 to 0.91.
Looking at the results from Table VII, the best unsupervised
option to consider is the unsupervised OC-SVM using his-
togram features with an F1 score of 98%. Second best option
would be the encoder+IForest on time-value features, which
shows only slightly worse overall F1 score when compared to
unsupervised OC-SVM with 11 percentage points difference.
C. Limitations
We identify three main limitations that apply to this treatise,
and to the best of our understanding also to other related works
in wireless network and IoT anomaly data that do not target
application data such as measurements.
First of all, every ML-based tool needs sufficient data for
training and evaluation. Quantifying "sufficient" is difficult
but in general it means that the model needs to see enough
training examples to be able to accurately approximate the
underlying distribution. Intuition would say that the data that is
"sufficient" to learn a normal distribution would be smaller in
size than the data needed to learn an exponential distribution.
While synthetic data is useful to develop a proof of concept,
for anything more than that real data is required. To the best
of our knowledge, only few related works consider real-world
data [26] and none of them uses link layer traces. In this study,
we synthetically injected anomalies in an available real-world
trace, as discussed in Section VIIa to support our claims, since
the utilized dataset as a motivating example in Section III only
included 11 links and was not sufficient to train automatic
feature extractors and classification models. As the models
were developed on IEEE 802.11 traces and the motivation
data from LOG-a-TEC contains IEEE 802.15.4 traces, where
both trace-sets are limited in size, the learnt model on IEEE
802.11 traces is not directly transferable, which indicates that
the developed models cannot be readily generalized across
various technologies and possibly for distinct applications.
We directly tested our model on the LOG-a-TEC traces,
which was trained on synthetic SuddenD anomaly type, as
shown in Fig. 10. The model was able to accurately detect
two of the anomalous links shown in Figs. 10c and 10i,
albeit its accuracy in detecting anomalies for the other four
anomalous links, shown in Figs. 10a, 10b, 10f, 10g and 10k,
was not adequate. Finally, our model falsely detected links as
anomalous, as illustrated in Figs. 10e and 10h. Although at
a glance they seem to be non-anomalous, they may be miss-
classified as anomalous by the model.
Secondly, the architecture of the autoencoder that learns the
encoded features has been selected for a small number of can-
didates as a result of the trial-and-error method. Having more
data would enable training an autoencoder, which then can
be better generalized for even unseen examples. Autoencoder
optimization and end-to-end deep learning for the proposed
anomaly types might bring further insights into developing
better performing and more reliable anomaly detection. How-
ever, as hyperparameter search in deep learning is challenging
and needs a large amount of training data, we leave such
optimization for future work.
Thirdly, in this study we only developed offline models
that would need to be periodically retrained in real-world
applications in order to account for the dynamically chang-
ing environment which is an inherent characteristic of the
wireless networks. This leads us to online models that can
learn from continuous incoming (streaming) data. Roughly
speaking, offline models outperform online counterpart models
at the expense of computational power, albeit online models
are able to automatically adapt in a faster manner, and also
simplify the detection system owing to its reduced storage
requirements.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we introduce four types of anomalies that can
be present in wireless links and are useful for being detected
in real-world operational IoT deployments. We demonstrated
that these anomalies were exposed on a real-world IoT deploy-
ment, namely the LOG-a-TEC testbed, and they significantly
affected the expected operations of the testbed. Motivated by
this, we develop detection models for each type of anomaly
by considering five different data representations and six
different ML techniques. We performed an extensive relative
evaluation of the models from data representations and ML
models perspective, and the limitations of our models are
discussed. The resulting tool-set for anomaly injection, feature
generation and model development are made publicly available
for reproducibility.
We show that the proposed data representations generated
by automatic feature learning with autoencoders outperform
other standard representations for all four anomaly types
namely, sudden degradation (SuddenD), sudden degradation
with recovery (SuddenR), instantaneous (InstaD) and slow
degradation (SlowD) anomalies. Next, we demonstrate that
automatically generated features with autoencoder exhibit the
most significant improvement, when we encode time-value
and FFT representations. However, encoding aggregated works
well only with the case of InstaD anomaly, and it performs
poor performance on histogram representation. Additionally,
for one specific technique, namely Local Outlier Factor (LOF),
encoded features are not conformable, as it significantly de-
grades the classification performance in all scenarios. For
every other ML model, let it be supervised or unsupervised,
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(a) N4 → N26 (b) N26 → N4 (c) N5 → N3 detected as anomalous
(d) N17 → N16 detected as anomalous (e) N2 → N25 detected as anomalous (f) N25 → N2
(g) N16 → N17 (h) N15 → N12 detected as anomalous (i) N6 → N13 detected as anomalous
(j) N3 → N5 detected as anomalous (k) N12 → N15
Figure 10. Anomaly detection test employed over real-world measurements gleaned from the LOG-a-TEC testbed, where for example, as in (g) N16→N17
indicates a communication link between nodes 16 and 17.
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i.e., Logistic Regression (LR), SVM, Random Forest, 1-class
SVM and Isolation Forest, encoded features show significant
improvement for all observed metrics, namely precision, recall
and F1 score.
We also show that considering all features and the best
performing models based on F1 score, supervised ML models,
in general, outperform their unsupervised counterpart models,
which is, on average, about 18% better on SuddenD and
SuddenR (e.g., encoder+SVM 77% vs. encoder+OC-SVM
63% with time-value features), and 2% better on SlowD
(e.g., SVM 98% vs. OC-SVM 100% with histogram features)
and about 2.6% better on InstaD (e.g., encoder+SVM 76%
vs. encoder+IForest 74% with time-value features). Further-
more, our analyses have shown that the improvement with
automatically generated encoded features can improve F1
score up to 500%, which was observed on encoded time-
value representation of supervised Random Forest with InstaD
anomaly and of unsupervised Isolation Forest with SlowD
anomaly. We also discuss model selection from the perspective
of precision and recall emphasizing tradeoffs. For instance,
when the application requires a precise detection model, then
given the same F1 score, one should choose the model with
a higher precision. If the application requires more relevant
anomalous link detection, given the same F1 score, one should
opt for the model with a higher recall.
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